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Digital platform enterprises are an increasingly central part of the global economy. The European 
Commission defines an online platform as “an undertaking operating in two (or multi)-sided 
markets, which uses the internet to enable interactions between two or more distinct but 
interdependent groups of users so as to generate value for at least one of the groups.”1 This 
covers a wide range of enterprises. This Perspective confines itself to a single case-study, the 
regulation of Uber taxi services, as an example of FDI issues involved.   
 
Uber is a US-based company operating a worldwide network of taxi services in many countries. 
It displays many characteristics of MNEs, including integrated transnational management, a 
unified business format and a network of overseas subsidiaries, used mainly to organize its tax 
affairs.2 Its presence raises questions as to how Uber should be regulated. Host countries can 
undoubtedly regulate digital platforms where their operations create a nexus with the host country 
through significant economic and social impacts. Uber has raised questions concerning its 
treatment of drivers, who use its platform to secure clients, the safety and consumer rights of those 
clients and Uber’s impact on competition in the taxi-services industry. Uber’s operations also raise 
issues relating to tax avoidance, but space prevents further discussion. 
  
Uber has argued that it is only a technology platform, bringing together self-employed drivers 
with clients, and not a taxi-services enterprise. Under EU law, Uber taxi services are treated as 
transportation services subject to member state regulation.3 However, national courts are 
divided over whether the drivers are employees entitled to labor protection or independent 
contractors. In addition, in September 2017, Uber had its operator’s license removed by Transport 
for London on the basis that it was not a “fit and proper” private car-hire operator. This ban was 
provisionally lifted twice, but was reinstated, subject to appeal, in November 2019.4 As to 
competition, Uber is often accused of undercutting existing taxi-service providers, including more 
highly regulated official municipal taxi services.5 Here the issue is nuanced. Uber can be said to 
offer greater consumer choice and pricing, but regulators must decide whether this is legitimate 
competition or an abuse of competitive power undermining market fairness. 
 
2 
The Uber case raises regulatory questions similar to those raised by “brick-and-mortar” foreign 
investors. However, Uber should not hide behind the “digital veil” and assume no managerial or 
legal responsibility for the wellbeing of drivers, or the welfare of passengers, just because it offers 
a cheap taxi service in the so-called “sharing economy.” In particular, Uber’s precise business 
field must be legally recognized. It is surprising that Uber London Limited was incorporated in 
2012 as engaging in “other information technology service activities” and remains so 
described,6 whereas it should be registered as “taxi operation” and “licensed carrier” similar to 
its competitors.7 Accurate incorporation would clarify what Uber does and avoid doubts that it 
should be regulated as a taxi operator and not an information-technology services firm. The 
latter description may offer an avenue for innovative flexibility in the development of Uber’s 
business model, but this must not come at the price of fair competition and responsible 
corporate behavior as expected from all taxi firms. 
 
In addition, Uber is undoubtedly an “investor” entitled to protection under international 
investment agreements (IIAs).8 This raises further issues concerning the legitimacy of host 
country regulation. The host country must ensure that its regulatory controls over Uber are IIA 
compliant. At the minimum, a non-discriminatory approach is required, a risk that arises out 
of Uber’s potential to weaken existing market structures and create a backlash of protectionist 
regulation. In addition, questions of fair and equitable treatment can arise, should regulators 
unduly interfere with the operation of Uber’s operations and, even, of expropriation if these 
measures effectively stop Uber from doing business in the host country. Accordingly, while 
regulators have a key public interest duty to ensure that Uber conforms with the regulatory 
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